Qualia

By Victor M Fontane

In the philosophy of mind, "qualia" (singular: "quale") refers to the subjective, qualitative, and conscious aspects of experiences. These are the "what it's like" qualities of our mental states, such as the redness of red, the pain of a headache, or the taste of chocolate. 

Subjective and Phenomenal: Qualia are the unique, personal, and introspectively accessible features of our experiences. They are the "what it feels like" aspect of a sensation or perception, rather than the objective, physical properties of the stimulus. 

Examples: Common examples include the distinct feeling of a sharp pain, the specific taste of a lemon, or the subjective experience of seeing a certain color. Controversy: Qualia are a central topic in the philosophy of mind and are often debated. Some philosophers argue that they are irreducible, nonphysical aspects of consciousness, while others try to explain them in terms of brain activity or other physical phenomena. Incommensurable: Some argue that qualia are ineffable, meaning they are difficult or impossible to fully convey to others through language. For example, it can be challenging to describe the sensation of pain to someone who has never experienced it. 

Thus, humans are totally disconnected from the real sensation of their experiences like some autonomous biological processes in their body that are not perceived like respiration, blood circulation , bacterial processes and sometimes even thoughts.

So, the work is to be aware of those processes paying attention to our breathing, heart beat, etc. and focusing on our life experiences breaking down all involved components, interpretations and the possible consequences of our actions to acquire mindfulness.